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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Cody William Parmer appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of battery with the intent to commit rape. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Coeur d'Alene police officer Greg Moore responded to the Kootenai 
Medical Center in response to a report of a sexual assault. (Tr.1, p.7, Ls.10-15.) 
There, 17-year-old S.H. reported to Moore and the attending physician that she 
had been raped by Cody Parmer. (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-23; p.368, Ls.7-15.) 
S.H. was at Parmer's residence the previous evening. (Tr., p.222, L.7 -
p.223, L.17; p.580, L.13 - p.581, L.6.) There, S.H., Parmer, Parmer's roommate 
Amanda Seeling, and another individual drank alcohol, danced, and played 
cards. (Tr., p.224, L.12 - p.225, L.9; p.229, L.13 - p.232, L.6.) While S.H. and 
Parmer were dancing, Parmer bit S.H.'s neck several times and tried to put his 
hands down her pants. (Tr., p.232, L.7 - p.233, L.11.) Later, S.H. wasn't feeling 
well and went to lay down on Seeling's bed, where she was soon joined by 
Parmer and Seeling. (Tr., p.233, L.12 - p.235, L.3.) When Seeling momentarily 
left the bed, Parmer rolled over on top of S.H., pulled down S.H.'s pants, and 
penetrated S.H.'s vagina with his penis. (Tr., p.236, Ls.12-23.) S.H. told Parmer 
to stop, and tried to push him off of her, but Parmer bit S.H. several times to 
overcome her resistance. (Tr., p.238, L.8 - p.240, L.21.) 
1 In its Respondent's brief, the state cites only to the transcript that contains the 
jury trial and sentencing hearing. The state refers to this transcript as "Tr." 
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S.H. finally got Parmer off of her, and fled the residence in her bare feet. 
(Tr., p.240, L.22 - p.241, L.4.) S.H. contacted several friends and eventually 
went to the Kootenai Medical Center. (Tr., p.241, Ls.5-24.) There, S.H. reported 
the incident, and medical personnel collected samples for a sexual assault kit. 
(Tr., p.8, Ls.14-23; p.368, Ls.7-15; p.383, Ls.13-21.) 
Officers interviewed Parmer at his residence, and then at the police 
station. (Tr., p.9, L.4 - p.18, L.6; State's Exhibits 3A, 4A, 4A2.) After initially 
denying having any sexual contact with S.H., Parmer eventually admitted to 
biting S.H., touching her vagina with his hand, and penetrating her vagina with 
his penis. (State's Exhibits 3A, 4A, 4A2, 4B.) At the conclusion of the interview, 
an officer took DNA samples from Parmer. (State's Exhibits 4A, 4A2.) 
A forensic scientist from the Idaho State Forensic Services Laboratory 
found one sperm cell head on one of the vaginal swabs taken from S.H. (Tr., 
p.437, L.5 - p.438, L.6.) The sample was insufficient to support DNA testing. 
(Tr., p.444, Ls.16-22.) Swabs taken from bite marks on S.H. revealed a mixed 
DNA profile to which Parmer could not be excluded as a contributor. (Tr., p.439, 
L.8 - p.443, L.22.) 
The state charged Parmer with rape and battery with the intent to commit 
rape. (R., pp.60-62.) At trial, the district court instructed the jury on the 
alternative theories of statutory (I.C. § 18-6101 (1 )) and forcible (I.C. § 18-
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6101 (3)) rape. 2 (R., pp.226-228.) The court also instructed the jury on battery 
with the intent to commit rape and simple battery as alternative lesser included 
offenses of rape. (R., pp.229-235.) The jury acquitted Parmer of rape, but 
convicted him of the lesser included offense of battery with the intent to commit 
rape. (R., pp.249-250). The district court imposed a unified 16-year sentence 
with six years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.302-304.) At the conclusion 
of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Parmer's 
sentence and placed him on probation for five years. (2/16/12 "Order 
Suspending Execution of Judgment and Sentence Following Retained 
Jurisdiction.")3 Parmer timely appealed. (8/26/11 Notice of Appeal.) 
2 At the time of the incident underlying Parmer's arrest, statutory rape was 
codified as I.C. § 18-6101 (1 ), and constituted sexual intercourse "[w]here the 
female is under the age of eighteen (18) years." Forcible rape was codified as 
I.C. § 18-6101(3). The legislature subsequently amended I.C. § 18-6101 to 
include two categories of statutory rape: I.C. § 18-6101(1) (where the female is 
under the age of 16 and the perpetrator is 18 years of age or older), and I.C. § 
18-6101 (2) (where the female is 16 or 17 years old and the perpetrator is three or 
more years older than the female). The legislature re-codified forcible rape as 
I.C. § 18-6101 (4). Idaho Session Laws 2010, ch. 352, § 1, p.1. 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Parmer's motion to augment the record with 
the district court's "Order Suspending Execution of Judgment and Sentence 
Following Retained Jurisdiction." (1/2/13 Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Parmer states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the prosecutor engage in a pattern of misconduct in 
cross-examination that requires reversal in this case? 
(Appellant's brief, p.12.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Parmer failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Parmer Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A Introduction 
Parmer contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his 
cross-examination of defense witness Amanda Seeling. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-
21.) Specifically, Parmer contends that upon receiving adverse rulings from the 
district court as to the propriety his questions, the prosecutor would "deliberately 
repeat the same offending question before the jury." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) 
Parmer contends that through this conduct, the prosecutor sought to present 
inadmissible evidence and to inflame the passions and prejudice of the jurors. 
(Id.) 
However, while Parmer objected to prosecutor's cross-examination 
questions he now challenges on appeal, he did not move for a mistrial after the 
district court sustained these objections. Parmer has thus already obtained the 
only relief that he actually sought during the trial. His appellate claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct are thus subject to fundamental error review. 
Parmer has failed to establish such fundamental error. A review of the 
prosecutor's cross-examination of Seeling reveals that while the prosecutor did 
rephrase several questions in response to sustained objections, he did not 
persist in questioning Seeling about any inadmissible subject matter, nor did his 
questions exhibit any intent to improperly influence th.e jury. Further, even if 
some of the prosecutor's questions were improper, Parmer has failed to establish 
prejudice to warrant vacating his conviction. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court 
exercises free review over questions of law." Kootenai Medical Center ex rel. 
Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630 
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted). A defendant who claims the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct has the burden of proving such. State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59,253 P.3d 727, 733 (2011) (citing State v. Perry. 150 
Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010)). 
C. Parmer Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim 
Appeals to the emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury through the use 
of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 
156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized 
"[t]he right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but 
a fair one," and the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor 
for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the 
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991). Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where the 
prosecutor "so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process." State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318, 127 
P.3d 212, 221 (Ct. App. 2005). 
"Idaho has limited appellate review of unobjected-to error to cases 
wherein the defendant has alleged the violation of a constitutionally protected 
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right." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To obtain appellate review and 
reversal on an issue not preserved through timely objection an appellant must 
demonstrate: (1) violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the error is 
clear and obvious without the need to further develop the evidence regarding the 
error or whether the lack of objection was a tactical decision; and (3) that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings. kl 
In this case, though Parmer objected to the prosecutor's cross-
examination questions at issue, he did not move for a mistrial after the district 
court sustained these objections. Parmer has thus already obtained the only 
relief that he actually sought during the trial. The district court did not have the 
opportunity to determine whether any improper questioning violated Parmer's 
due process rights, or warranted additional relief beyond the sustaining of 
Parmer's objections. Instead, Parmer raises these issues for the first time on 
appeal, and is thus subject to fundamental error analysis of these claims. 
1. Parmer Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Violated His Due 
Process Rights 
Parmer has failed to satisfy the first prong of Perry because he has failed 
to show that his constitutional due process rights were violated. In this case, the 
prosecutor cross-examined defense witness Amanda Seeling about her 
observations on the night of the incident. (Tr., p.598, L.6 -p.634, L.22; p.636, 
L.23 - p.642, L.2.) Prior to trial, Seeling had participated in an interview with the 
prosecutor and a state investigator. (See Tr., p.605, Ls.15-20.) On several 
occasions during the state's cross-examination of Seeling, the prosecutor 
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referred to this prior interview and directed Seeling to review portions of a 
corresponding transcript, at times to attempt to refresh her recollection, and at 
others to impeach her. (Tr., p.605, L.12 - p.638, L.24.) Defense counsel made 
several objections on various grounds during this questioning, some of which 
were sustained. (Id.) 
Relevant to this appeal, defense counsel first objected to the prosecutor's 
line of inquiry regarding whether S.H. appeared scared when Parmer was on top 
of her in Seeling's bed. (Tr., p.610, L.6 - p.612, L.12.) At trial, Seeling testified 
that she didn't look at S.H.'s face while Parmer was on top of her, and thus could 
not tell whether S.H. appeared to be afraid. (Tr., p.610, Ls.6-17.) The 
prosecutor presented Seeling with the transcript of her prior interview in which 
See ling indicated that S. H. did, in fact, appear scared when Parmer was on top 
of her. (Tr., p. 61 0, L. 1 8 - p. 611 , L. 14.) 
After Seeling acknowledged her previous statement, the prosecutor 
asked, "So you were lying to myself and [the investigator]?" (Tr., p.611, Ls.11-
17.) The court sustained Parmer's subsequent objection that the question was 
argumentative. (Tr., p.611, Ls.15-19.) The prosecutor rephrased the question to 
ask, "You were not telling the correct version of what happened when you spoke 
with [the investigator] and myself?" (Tr., p.611, Ls.21-23.) Parmer objected 
again, and the court sustained the objection. (Tr., p.611, L.25 - p.612, L.2.) The 
prosecutor rephrased the question once more to ask, "Which version is the 
correct one?" (Tr., p.612, L.4.) Parmer did not object to this final phrasing of the 
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question, and Seeling responded that she couldn't remember, due to the level of 
her intoxication the night of the incident. (Tr., p.612, Ls.4-12.) 
On appeal, Parmer contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
continuing this pattern of questioning regarding Seeling's prior statements 
despite the court's adverse evidentiary rulings. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-21.) 
Parmer further contends that the prosecutor's "insinuations that Ms. Seeling was 
lying were calculated to inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury." 
(Appellant's brief, p.17.) Parmer's challenge fails for several reasons. 
First, despite Parmer's attempts to characterize the prosecutor's cross-
examination of Seeling as containing repeated forages into impermissible subject 
matter, it was not the substance of the information the prosecutor attempted to 
elicit that was the subject of Parmer's trial objections at issue. Instead, these 
objections were raised on the grounds that the nature of the questions 
themselves were argumentative. Contrary to Parmer's assertion (Appellant's 
brief, pp.15-16), a sustained objection on the ground that a question is 
argumentative does not necessarily require a prosecutor to entirely abandon the 
substance of the line of questioning. Upon the district court's rulings that a 
question was argumentative, the prosecutor attempted to appropriately re-phrase 
the question. 
Further, the prosecutor's numerous references to Seeling's prior interview 
statements did not, as Parmer contends, constitute "identical questions," but 
instead covered a variety of topics related to Seeling's observations of the 
incident. Indeed, while Parmer appears to suggest that the district court's 
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sustaining of his first objection on the ground that the prosecutor's question was 
argumentative prohibited Parmer from challenging Seeling's testimony with her 
prior statements in any other context, the district court's evidentiary rulings did 
not so restrict the prosecutor. 
In addition, a review of the context of the additional portions of the cross-
examination challenged by Parmer on appeal reveals that while the prosecutor's 
exchanges with Seeling were at times somewhat contentious, and did result in 
several sustained defense objections, they did not constitute an improper appeal 
to the emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury, or rise to the level of 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
Some time after cross-examining Seeling on whether she observed S.H. 
to be afraid when Parmer was on top of her, the prosecutor questioned Seeling 
about her testimony on direct examination that there had been sexual contact 
between herself and S.H. the night of the incident. (Tr., p.625, L.7 - p.628, L.4.) 
The prosecutor asked Seeling why she did not share this information with the 
police officer who had interviewed her. (Tr., p.625, Ls.7-14.) Seeling responded 
that the police officer "wasn't asking about me." (Tr., p.625, Ls.14-15.) The 
prosecutor then asked, "You didn't tell him because [the sexual contact between 
Seeling and S.H.] didn't happen. Isn't that right?" (Tr., p.625, Ls.19-20.) The 
district court sustained Parmer's objection that this question was argumentative. 
(Tr., p.625, Ls.19-23.) 
The prosecutor then switched gears and asked Seeling whether she had 
ever told anyone else that there was no sexual contact between herself and S.H. 
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(Tr.,. p.625, L.25 - p.626, L.6.) Seeling acknowledged that she told the 
prosecutor and the state's investigator that no such contact took place, thus 
admitting that her trial testimony was contrary to her prior statements. (Tr., 
p.626, Ls.7-8.) When the prosecutor then asked, "Why would you lie to myself 
and [the investigator]?," the district court sustained Parmer's objection on the 
ground that the question was argumentative, and specifically ordered the 
prosecutor to rephrase the question. (Tr., p.626, Ls.12-20.) The prosecutor did 
so, and continued on this line of inquiry for several more questions, without 
further sustained objection. (Tr., p.626, L.22 - p.628, L.4.) 
The apparent contradiction between Seeling's trial testimony and her prior 
statements to the prosecutor and the state investigator was an entirely 
appropriate topic for cross-examination. While the prosecutor re-phrased two 
questions in response to sustained defense objections, he did not attempt to elicit 
inadmissible testimony or otherwise engage in questioning that rose to the level 
of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Later, the prosecutor cross-examined Seeling on her testimony on re-
direct that, to the best she could recall from the evening of the incident, she did 
not observe anything that indicated that Parmer "forced himself" on S.H. (Tr., 
p.636, L.17 - p.641, L.23.) Specifically, the prosecutor inquired as to how 
Seeling could have such an opinion in light of evidence and Seeling's prior 
statements that suggested that at the time of the incident: S. H. asked See ling for 
help; S.H. told Seeling that she was afraid; Seeling pushed Parmer off of S.H. 
when he was on top of her in bed; and that Parmer had bitten S.H., leaving 
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marks on her body. (Id.) The prosecutor asked, "This opinion that [defense 
counsel] asked you about and that you gave us, you're giving us that opinion 
after looking at those bite marks on that girl's body?" (Tr., p.638, Ls.7-10.) The 
district court sustained Parmer's objection on the ground that this question was 
argumentative. (Tr., p.638, Ls.11-13.) The prosecutor rephrased the question 
and asked, "Well, how can you think that his advances were not unwanted when 
you look at those bite marks?" (Tr., p.638, Ls.15-17.) Parmer objected again on 
the ground that the question was argumentative, and the district court sustained 
the objection. (Tr., p.638, Ls.18-24.) Upon this second objection, however, 
rather than invite the prosecutor to rephrase the question, the court precluded 
further questioning on this topic, stating that the prosecutor's question went 
beyond calling merely for Seeling's opinion as to S.H.'s consent to any sexual 
content, and instead referred to "what was [actually] going on at the time." (Tr., 
p.638, Ls.20-25.) The prosecutor asked Seeling no further questions about the 
bite marks on S.H. 
The basis of Seeling's testimony on re-direct examination that she did not 
observe anything that indicated that Parmer "forced himself' on S.H. was an 
entirely appropriate topic for cross-examination. While the prosecutor again 
rephrased several questions in response to sustained defense objections, he did 
not attempt to elicit inadmissible testimony or otherwise engage in questioning 
that rose to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. 
In the final challenged portion of the prosecutor's cross-examination of 
Seeling, after Seeling testified that she observed S.H.'s pants around her ankles 
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while Parmer was on top of her, the prosecutor asked her how S.H.'s pants got 
there. (Tr., p.614, Ls.20-24.) Seeling responded that she did not know because 
she was smoking at the time. (Tr., p.614, L.25 - p.615, L.1.) The prosecutor 
then asked, "Didn't he rip them down there?," and Seeling responded that she 
didn't know. (Tr., p.615, Ls.2-3.) At that point, the prosecutor directed Seeling to 
a transcript of her prior interview, but Seeling asserted that she didn't remember 
whether or not Parmer had put S.H.'s pants around her ankles. (Tr., p.615, Ls.4-
15.) Then the prosecutor asked a slightly different question, whether Seeling had 
told anyone that she thought Parmer had taken S.H's pants off of her. (Tr., 
p.615, Ls.16-17.) The district court sustained Parmer's objection to this question 
on the grounds of "lack of foundation, personal knowledge." (Tr., p.615, Ls.16-
20.) The prosecutor then repeated his earlier question, "And he ripped those 
down to her ankles?" and the district court sustained Parmer's objection that the 
question had been asked and answered. (Tr., p.615, Ls.22-25.) 
While the prosecutor's final question was appropriately stricken by the 
district court for its repetition, the prosecutor's cross-examination of Seeling on 
this topic was hardly so egregious as to rise to the level of prosecutorial 
misconduct. Seeling's observations and prior statements regarding whether she 
saw, or thought, that Parmer pulled S.H.'s pants down was certainly a proper 
topic for cross-examination. Once again, the prosecutor did not elicit or attempt 
to elicit any inadmissible evidence. The objectionable nature of the prosecutor's 
questions was again rooted with the questions themselves. Immediately after the 
district made its first and only "asked and answered" evidentiary ruling with 
13 
regard to this topic, the prosecutor immediately moved on to another topic. (Tr., 
p.615, L.23 - p.616, L.4.) 
Parmer has failed to establish that the prosecutor committed misconduct. 
The purpose of cross examination is to weaken the testimony of the party 
examined. State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 655, 691 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct. App. 
1994). This was the intent of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Seeling. 
While the district court had the discretion, pursuant to I.R.E. 611 (a), to exercise 
control over and to manage this cross-examination, and specifically to require the 
prosecutor to rephrase some of his questions, and to order him to cease 
questioning entirely on certain topics, the court's use of this discretion did not 
expose any prosecutorial misconduct in this case. The prosecutor did not 
attempt to elicit inadmissible testimony, to defy any evidentiary rulings, or to 
improperly inflame the passions of the jury. Instead, the prosecutor simply 
subjected Seeling to spirited cross-examination on several of the topics raised in 
her direct examination. This did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. 
Parmer has therefore failed to satisfy the first prong of the Perry fundamental 
error test. 
2. Parmer Has Failed To Show That Any Error Was Harmless 
The third and final prong of the Perry fundamental error test requires 
Parmer to "demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning 
(in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
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proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Parmer has failed to 
make such a showing. 
Any impact on the jury of the challenged cross-examination questions 
was limited because each of these questions resulted in a sustained objection. 
See 19.:. at 228-229, 245 P.3d at 980-981 (holding that where defense counsel 
objected to a question and the district court sustained the objection, harm was 
avoided). In this case, it is unclear what specific improper harm the prosecutor's 
challenged questions alone may have caused. On appeal, Parmer has not 
hypothesized how the prosecutor's questions may have prejudiced him, except to 
broadly label their "inflammatory language seemingly calculated to arouse 
negative emotions." (Appellant's brief, p.19.) The challenged questions did not 
elicit or reveal inadmissible evidence, reference any inadmissible or damaging 
information about Parmer, or directly or indirectly implore the jurors find its verdict 
on some improper basis. Instead, Parmer's objections to the questions were 
based primarily on their phrasing and timing. 
Further, a review of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Seeling reveals 
that Seeling's testimony was likely not even particularly helpful to Parmer's 
defense. Seeling acknowledged that she was heavily intoxicated the night of the 
incident, which, as she explained numerous times over the course of her 
testimony, impacted her memory of the events. (Tr., p.602, L.4 - p.603, L.18; 
p.607, L.15 - p.608, L.5; p.612, Ls.13-18; p.616, L.21 - p.617, L.6; p.618, L.4 -
p.619, L.6.) Much of what Seeling could remember was not particularly 
supportive of Parmer's defense theory, presented at closing argument (Tr., 
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p.677, L.18 - p.680, L.25), that Parmer did not penetrate Seeling's vagina with 
his penis. Seeling testified that she observed that S.H.'s pants were around her 
ankles, and that she saw Parmer's bare buttocks "going back and forth," when he 
was on top of her. (Tr., p.612, L.22 - p.613, L.10.) Further, Seeling did not 
present any affirmative testimony which significantly bolstered Parmer's defense. 
Even if the prosecutor's objected-to questions somehow improperly impacted the 
jury's view of Seeling's credibility, Parmer cannot show that his rights were 
prejudiced by any such impact. 
Even if Parmer had established prosecutorial misconduct in his case, any 
such error did not prejudice his right to a fair trial. Parmer has therefore failed to 
establish that any such misconduct warrants vacating his conviction, and has 
thus failed to satisfy the third prong of the Perry fundamental error test. 
D. Parmer Has Failed To Establish Cumulative Error 
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there 
is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, 
but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention 
of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 
576, 594, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted). 
A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding 
of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 
1998). In addition, cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither 
objected to nor found fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982 
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Parmer has failed to show any error, much less two or more objected-to 
errors. Thus, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See, 
~. LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Parmer guilty of battery with the 
intent to commit rape. 
DATED this 25th day of March, 2013. 
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